List meaningful actions
Start with the actions that change or expose important information: viewing a case, assigning work, approving a request, exporting records, or changing another person’s access.
Group those actions according to actual responsibilities. Avoid creating a broad administrator role merely because it is convenient during development. Identify which exceptional tasks need powerful access and whether they should be separated from routine operation.
Define the scope of access
An action may be permitted only within a team, account, project, or assigned record. Record that scope explicitly. “Can edit requests” is incomplete if the user should only edit requests belonging to their own organization.
Enforce the rules on the server and test them independently of what the interface displays. Consider direct requests, exports, background jobs, and administrative tools, not only the most visible screen. OWASP: authorization guidance.
Review how access changes
Define what happens when someone joins a team, changes responsibilities, or leaves. Decide who can approve access and how temporary privileges are removed. Keep a useful record of consequential changes.
Test representative users with both permitted and prohibited actions. Include a user who belongs to more than one group and a record that changes ownership. These cases often reveal assumptions hidden by a simple demonstration account.
A role model should be understandable to the people who authorize access. If nobody can explain why a role needs a permission, revisit the grouping. Clarity at this level reduces the chance that routine support work becomes a reason to grant unnecessarily broad access.
Write the action matrix before naming the roles.
A role name such as “manager” is ambiguous until it is connected to actions and records. Start with the business boundaries. In this example, requesters can work with their own requests, coordinators manage a department’s queue, and account administrators manage access. A real organization may choose different boundaries.
| Action | Requester | Coordinator | Account administrator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Read request | Own requests | Assigned department | Only if separately granted |
| Assign technician | No | Assigned department | No automatic grant |
| Change access | No | No | Within administration scope |
| Download attachment | Same record boundary as reading | Same record boundary as reading | Only if separately granted |
OWASP’s authorization guidance recommends explicit access decisions, checking permissions on requests, and testing the logic. The table is a way to make the application’s intended policy reviewable before it becomes scattered conditionals.
Test relationships as well as role names.
# Illustrative test cases, not an authorization implementation
requester + own request => allow read
requester + another user's record => deny read
coordinator + own department => allow assignment
coordinator + another department => deny assignment
removed department membership => deny subsequent assignment
unrecognized role => deny protected operationThe server needs the current actor, requested action, and relevant record context. Hiding an assignment button is useful interface behavior, but it is not the enforcement boundary. Test the endpoint directly, including references to records outside the permitted relationship. Apply the same policy to exports, search snippets, attachments, and background operations that act for a user.
Decide what happens when access changes while somebody has a page open. The interface may still display an old control, but the next protected request should be evaluated under the applicable current policy. Where cached permissions exist, define their invalidation or expiry behavior rather than assuming a screen refresh is the security mechanism.
Keep the audit trail focused on accountable changes: who granted access, what scope changed, and when. Review inherited or exceptional grants periodically. A small explicit matrix with representative denial tests is often easier to maintain than a large hierarchy whose names conceal overlapping privileges.
A practical example.
A request application may distinguish submitters, coordinators, and administrators. Write an action matrix before implementing those labels: who can view each request, assign it, change its details, and manage other users? Roles are only useful when their permissions have a precise meaning.
Test boundary cases such as a coordinator in another department or a former owner after reassignment. The server must apply the access rules even if a user bypasses the normal interface. Also define how role changes take effect and who can grant them. Keep routine operational permissions separate from account administration when the workflow allows it. Review the matrix with the people responsible for the business process, using representative records rather than abstract role names alone.
Put it into practice.
- Describe permissions as actions on records, including ownership and department limits.
- Enforce rules on the server and test unauthorized requests directly.
- Define who grants access and how changes or departures remove it.